If might makes right, and treaties and laws are “niceties,” as Stephen Miller, US President Donald Trump’s deputy chief-of-staff recently said, Europe—with its limited hard power leverage and preference for rules-based approaches—clearly has a problem.
Certainly, the European Union remains one of world’s largest economic blocs and is also a regulatory superpower. Yet in the emerging geopolitical environment, it is struggling to convert these assets into agency. While others shape the conditions under which power is exercised, European leaders are too often left to manage the consequences of decisions taken elsewhere. In a world where major actors have ceased to regard the rules of the liberal international order as binding—seeking instead to revise them, bend norms to their advantage, and organize power around spheres of influence—Europe must urgently define a means by which it can still shape order rather than being the continent where order is contested.
The survival of the European model itself is at stake. It rests on a preference for soft power, international cooperation, free trade, and legal constraint. It was never designed to operate in an environment dominated by great-power politics—indeed, it was conceived in explicit opposition to them. Today, however, the international conditions that once enabled this model no longer hold. This transformation of the international system does not imply that rules or institutions disappear altogether. But they are less able to structure behavior and restrain power—precisely the conditions on which Europe has long relied. Particularly challenging for Europe is the fact that the United States has moved from being the principal defender of this system to one of the key actors that now regards it as fundamentally misaligned with its interests.
A New Strategic Environment
Four overarching trends now define the strategic environment in which Europe must operate. First, international relations are becoming increasingly brutalized: Coercion, intimidation, and the use of force are once again central instruments of statecraft. Major powers—including the US, Russia, and China—are disrespecting the existing rules or interpreting them to serve their interests. In this framework, great powers dictate global politics, and smaller states are supposed to accept and implement their decisions. Second, the competition over resources is continuing to intensify, spanning energy, minerals, and strategic technologies. Third, multipolarity is rising, as an increasing number of actors seek to expand their influence, challenge established hierarchies, reshape economic and connectivity networks, and build alternative forms of cooperation outside Western structures. Fourth, technology has emerged as a critical instrument of power, both economically and militarily.
At the heart of this transformation lies the renewed primacy of violence—economic, political, and above all military. States are prepared to go to war to secure their interests, often disregarding international institutions, and established rules of law. Many are embarking on expansive rearmament programs, while at the same time arms-control agreements are approaching expiration. International relations are therefore hardening, and Europe must find a way to safeguard its interests in a world where power politics and victories, rather than negotiations and compromise, determine outcomes.
These dynamics are unlikely to ease soon. In 2026, conflict risks remain high across multiple theaters: The Middle East remains volatile, tensions in the Arctic are increasing, and the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a zone of strategic competition, as the US intervention in Venezuela has shown. Under the Trump administration, the US has revived a modern interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine—the “Donroe Doctrine”—aimed at restoring US dominance in North and South America, asserting the region as a privileged sphere of influence, and excluding non‑hemispheric competitors, such as China and Russia, from projecting power there. China is expected to continue trying to expand its power in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific at large, in part to probe US responses. Russia, meanwhile, is likely to press on with its war in Ukraine.
For Europe, a revisionist Russia remains the most acute threat: Moscow’s objectives are unchanged, it is preparing for prolonged conflict, and its efforts to undermine Europe are evident, from sabotage to disinformation campaigns. Even if Russia’s war in Ukraine were to be frozen in 2026, Moscow’s interest in revising the European security order and securing what it regards as its “rightful” place would persist.
A Costly Catch-Up
The continent must become more sovereign and resilient, not only in terms of technology, industry, and the military, but also in the defense of its democratic model. Yet, doing so is costly, politically difficult, and at odds with the kind of international environment many Europeans would prefer to inhabit.
Across Europe, military capabilities are being rebuilt, albeit unevenly. Some governments continue to question the necessity of rearmament, while others lack the economic capacity to pursue it at scale. Europeans also agree that the other instruments of power need a boost, such as technologies, but they struggle to create the conditions to support them. Europeans also understand that they must reset their partnerships and build a pragmatic Western alliance with those states that share at least the basic assumptions of their world view—international law, sovereignty, free trade, territorial integrity. Countries like Japan and also Australia seem to be attractive partners when it comes to defending an international model under pressure. Finally, Europe’s frameworks, the EU and NATO, need to become more agile and flexible to avoid obstruction. The increasing reliance on smaller frameworks, like the “coalition of the willing” for Ukraine, is a step in the right direction.
The agenda is well known; but implementation remains slow. This hesitation is compounded by a weakening of Europe’s traditional leaders. The US has shifted from being a guarantor of the liberal order to a source of strategic uncertainty. The United Kingdom wants to lead but is still finding its position outside the EU and is wondering whether the special relationship with Washington still holds. France has articulated a vision, yet persistent domestic political and economic constraints limit its capacity to act.
As a result, attention is increasingly turning to Germany. Among Europe’s major powers, it remains comparatively stable politically and economically. The German government is under pressure from the far right, but it is still in a better position than the one in London, and far away from the political chaos in Paris. If its rearmament is successful, Germany is likely to become the continent’s strongest conventional military power. Therefore, many partners, such as the Baltics and Scandinavians, want Berlin to lead this European adjustment—and trust it to do so.
This raises a familiar dilemma. Can Berlin help the continent to form a power bloc that asserts its interests vis-à-vis Russia, China, and the United States? Or will it lead half-heartedly, divide the continent, or even try to go it alone? Berlin’s willingness to lead might increase, not least because it is suffering already from the consequences of the changing international order. A strong Germany serving Europe would indeed be a novelty—after all, Germany has historically used its military strength against, not for, Europe.
Yet, the more responsibility Germany assumes, the more it must consider the perspectives of its partners. Although many Europeans are calling for Berlin to take the lead, there is growing concern in some capitals about Germany becoming a hegemon that will shape not only Europe’s politics and economy, but now also its defense, according to its own rules. France and Poland appear wary of a Germany-shaped European defense.
Berlin must hence design leadership in a participatory and inclusive way. This is already happening in groups of states such as the E3 (Germany, France, and the UK) or the Group of Five (E3 plus Poland and Italy), which prepare European positions, for example on Ukraine. If Berlin leads by integrating partners, sharing risks, and anchoring its actions firmly within European frameworks, it can mitigate fears of dominance and unilateralism. Then, the 2026 answer to the German question could be for Germany to serve as the enabler of a stronger and more capable Europe.
Claudia Major is senior vice president for transatlantic security of the German Marshall Fund (GMF) and director of its Berlin office.
Jana Puglierin is senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and head of its Berlin office.
